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Abstract: The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) has become the de facto standard for authentication of transacting entities since its inception as 
a standard by NIST. An integral part of the signing process in DSA is the generation of a random number called a nonce or an ephemeral key. If 
sufficient caution is not taken while generating the nonce, it can lead to the discovery of the private-key paving the way for critical security 
violations further on. The standard algorithms for generation of the nonce as specified by NIST, as well as the widely implemented random 
number generators, fail to serve as true random sources, thus leaving the DSA algorithm open to attack, resulting in possible signature forgery in 
electronic transactions, by potential attackers. Furthermore, the user can select the nonce arbitrarily, which leads to a subliminal channel being 
present to exchange messages through each signature, which may be intolerable for security reasons. In this paper, we have improved the 
security of the DSA algorithm by proposing an efficient nonce-generation process, which ensures that the generated nonce is sufficiently random 
as well as unique for each generated signature, thereby securing the signing process. Furthermore, our algorithm also ensures that there are no 
subliminal channels present in DSA. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A digital signature scheme is a process by which a receiver can 
verify the authenticity of the origin of a message, as well as be 
assured of its integrity simultaneously. The scheme is based on 
the public-key cryptographic system [1] and requires that the 
signer maintain two keys – one private (or secret-key), and 
another, a public-key; the latter assumed to be safely 
maintained by a Trusted Centre (TC), and is available to 
anyone. The private-key is strictly and confidentially 
maintained by its owner. A message-digest of the file to be 
signed, is computed first, followed by applying the signing 
algorithm on this digest using the signer’s private key. 
Optionally, instead of the digest, the entire message can be 
used as well, however, using the digest instead of the message 
is computationally more efficient for signing purposes. The 
original file, the generated signature, and optionally the signer’s 
public-key, are sent to the receiver, who re-computes the digest 
and verifies the signature using the signer’s public-key. If the 
verification succeeds, the message is authentic (i.e. it is indeed 
the claimant who has sent the message), and it has not been 
altered in transit. The security of this scheme lies in the 
computational difficulty in solving the discrete logarithm 
problem [18], which would otherwise lead to the discovery of 
the signer’s private key from the corresponding public-key. 
The signing process requires the generation of an 
integer, called the nonce or ephemeral key, which must be 
generated randomly or pseudo-randomly, and must be unique 
for all messages originating from that sender. If an attacker 
ever recovers the nonce that has been used to sign the message, 
perhaps by exploiting some properties of the pseudorandom 
number generator used to generate it, he/she can recover the 
signer’s private-key. Moreover, if the signer uses the same 
nonce to sign two messages, the attacker can recover the 
private-key even if he/she is unaware of the actual value of the 
nonce used [13] [14].  
The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [2] suggests 
two ways for generating the nonce, but both suffer from being 
vulnerable to lattice attacks as shown by various papers [5] [7] 
[8] [9], due to the use of a Linear Congruential Random Bit 
Generator (RBG), which suffers from the flaw that they are 
predictable once the seed used to initialize it is revealed. RBGs 
are of the form: f(n)=(a+b×n)(mod m), where a, b, and m are 
parameters to the function. Seemingly random numbers are 
returned by the function because the numbers form a part of a 
very large sequence that is unavailable for instant comparison. 
However, the values for these parameters can be estimated if a 
large number of nonces are mistakenly revealed. 
 The nonce, when instead of being generated 
randomly, is rather chosen arbitrarily by the signer, reveals 
another flaw in the DSA scheme. There exists a subliminal 
channel [17] in DSA, through which the signer and the verifier 
can communicate secretly by exchanging messages through 
each signature. Since however the nonces must be random, and 
messages, by nature, are non-random – the signer must encrypt 
the messages, preferably using a one-time pad, and then use 
this encrypted random message as the nonce. It should be clear 
that the maximal length of the message should be that of the 
size of the nonce. The receiver, on the other hand should be 
aware of the signer’s private-key to obtain this nonce, and 
hence, the message. 
Our proposed scheme generates nonces securely, and 
is not based on Linear Congruential number generators. 
Instead, it uses Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random 
Number Generators (CSPRNGs) as well as additional masking 
processes, to make the nonce generation process foreseeably 
secure. Section 2 of this paper recapitulates on the Digital 
Signature Algorithm as laid down in the NIST’s standard, 
followed by an overview of the attacks on DSA in Section 3, 
where several lattice as well as non-lattice attacks are 
mentioned, specifically targeted at the nonce generation 
process of DSA. Section 4.1 presents the proposed algorithm 
for secure nonce generation, and Sections 4.2 – 4.10 explain the 
key steps of the algorithm. Finally in Section 5, we conclude 
with our results and an informal security analysis of our 
algorithm, stating the advantages of implementing it in any 
signature generation scheme based on DSA. 
2. DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of 
the U.S. Govt. published the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 
under FIPS PUB 186-3 [2], which proposed an algorithm, 
known as Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), for generation 
and verification of digital signatures. A brief review of the 
algorithm is given below. In DSA, a Trusted Center (TC) is 
responsible for generating and publishing system parameters 
for public usage. 
 
2.1 Parameter Sizes 
(L, N): it is a bit-length pair for generation of system 
parameters. For the purposes of our algorithm: L=2048 and 
N=224. 
2.2 System Parameters  
p: A prime modulus, where 2L-1 < p < 2L 
q: A prime divisor of (p-1), where 2N-1 < q < 2N 
g: h(p-1)/q (mod p), where h is a random integer with 1 < h 
< p 
2.3 Private and Public Keys 
x: each user selects an integer x as his private-key, with 
1 < x < q 
y: corresponding to x, the user computes y=gx (mod p) 
2.4 Signature Generation 
The signer computes the following values corresponding to a 
message m to be signed: 
 
k: a secret number that is unique to each message; k is an 
integer, which is generated randomly or pseudo-randomly, 
in the range [1, q-1]. (From here on in this document, k is 
referred to as the “nonce”) 
r=(gk (mod p) )    (mod q) 
s=(k-1. (H(m)+x.r) )   (mod q) where, H(m) is a one-way 
keyless hash function 
 
The pair (r, s) constitutes the digital signature of the message 
m, signed by the user with public-key y and private-key x. 
2.5 Signature Verification 
To verify the signature pair (r, s), the recipient computes: 
 
w=s-1     (mod q) 
u1=(w×H(m) )    (mod q) 
u2=(w×r)    (mod q) 
r'=(gu1×yu2  (mod p) )   (mod q) 
 
If r=r' the signature is authentic, otherwise not. 
 
 
3. ATTACKS ON DSA 
 
3.1 Computational Basis of DSA Security 
 
The security of DSA is based on the computational difficulty in 
solving the discrete logarithm problem in prime fields and its 
subgroups, and it can be proved under the random oracle model 
[3], which assumes that the hash function behaves like a 
random oracle, i.e. its values are independent and uniformly 
distributed. It is cautioned in the standard that if the nonce (k) 
is disclosed, the secret-key can be easily recovered. 
3.2 The Insecurity of Standard RBG 
Standard Random-Bit Generators (RBGs) are typically used to 
generate random bits in software/hardware using a Linear 
Congruential Generator (LCG). One of the most commonly 
used is the Knuth’s LCG [15]. It was shown by Belarre et al. 
[4] that the secret-key of DSA can be recovered if the nonce is 
generated by Knuth’s linear congruential generator with known 
parameters. This attack is provable and relies on Babai’s 
approximation algorithm [5], based on the LLL algorithm [6]. 
Howgrave-Graham and Smart [7] showed that, even if the 
nonce is known only partially, i.e. only some of its bits are 
revealed, for a reasonable number of signatures, a number of 
heuristic attacks are possible to recover the secret-key. Finally, 
Nguyen and Shparlinski [8] presented a provable polynomial-
time attack against DSA when the nonces are partially known, 
under two assumptions: the size of q should not be too small 
compared to p, and the probability of collisions for the hash 
function H should not be too large compared to 1/q. Under 
these conditions, if for a certain number of random messages 
µM and random nonces k[1,q-1], about log(1/2)  q least 
significant bits of k are known, then in polynomial time, one 
can recover the signer’s secret-key x. 
4. SECURE NONCE GENERATION 
4.1 The Proposed Algorithm 
Our algorithm proposes to augment the existing signature 
algorithm with a secure nonce-generation process in place of 
the existing schemes recommended by DSS. Our algorithm 
(Algorithm I) uses a cryptographically secure pseudorandom 
number generator (CSPRNG) instead of the simple RBG with 
additional processing to improve security. 
A brief outline of our algorithm (Algorithm I) is as follows:  
a) The algorithm takes two parameters as input; first is 
the message or data to be signed (the first 2048 bytes 
of it, if the message is larger than that), stored in the 
byte-vector M, and the second is the signer’s 224-bit 
private-key. The algorithm begins with padding and 
dividing the message into 512-bit blocks, while the 
224-bit key goes through two rounds of key-
expansions to generate a 512-bit key suitable for use 
in our algorithm. The initial key-expansion (Section 
4.2) expands it from 224 bits to 256-bits. This is 
known as the Partially Expanded Key (PEK). The 
second round of expansion is the Rijndael expansion 
(Algorithm II), (which is the standard Rijndael key-
expansion [10] routine performed twice), expanding it 
further to 512-bits (Section 4.4). This is now referred 
to as the Fully Expanded Key (FEK). 
b) The algorithm then iterates 32 times, once for each of 
the 512-bit blocks. In each round, the following steps 
are performed: 
i. A different 512-bit round-key is generated in 
each round using a CSPRNG. 
ii. The 512-bit message-block for this round 
undergoes a block-substitution (Section 4.6, 
Algorithm III) using the PEK as the key, to 
obtain the Substituted-Message-Block 
(SMB). The substitution is achieved in a 
Feistel network of 8 rounds, and each round 
consists of the following: 
a)  A different 256-bit round-key is 
generated (Algorithm IV) for each 
round using the PEK as input. 
b)  The message-block is divided into 
two halves, of 32-bytes each. A 
copy of the left-half and the round-
key are then encrypted (using 
Algorithm V). 
c) The right-half is XOR-ed with the 
encrypted block, and finally, the 
data for the next round is formed by 
concatenation of the original left-
half and the currently modified 
right-half. 
iii. The SMB and the Round-Key is passed 
through the Shabal Key-Permutation 
Schedule [11] for a permutation operation 
(Section 4.7), to obtain a 896-bit output. 
iv. The 896-bit permuted block undergoes a 
compression (Section 4.8, Figure 1) followed 
by a substitution (Section 4.9) using the non-
invertible S-Box Z (see Table I) to obtain a 
512-bit output, known as the Compressed-
Permuted Message-Block (CPMB). 
v. The FEK is modified to store the bitwise 
XOR of the CPMB and the current value of 
the FEK. 
c) The modified FEK is hashed using HMAC SHA-512, 
using the PEK as the key, to obtain the digest (Section 
4.8). 
d) The digest obtained in the previous step is compressed 
(Section 4.8, Algorithm VI), from 512-bits to 224-bits, 
to finally generate the nonce. 
 
A detailed description of the algorithm steps are outlined 
below. 
 
Algorithm I. Nonce Generation 
 
Input: The message to be signed (M), the signer’s 224-bit private-key (S) 
Output: The 224-bit nonce or ephemeral key 
 
begin 
 X = ExpandKey(S); 
 B[1..n]=Pad(M); 
 F=RijndaelExpand(X, A);  // Algorithm II 
 for i=1 to n do 
 begin 
  R=CSPRNG_Random( ); 
  T=BlockSubstitute(X, B[i]); // Algorithm III 
  C=CompSub(ShabalPermute(T, R)); 
  F=F xor C; 
 end 
 K=HMAC_SHA512(F, X); 
 return Compress(K);   // Algorithm VI 
end 
 
4.2  Initial Key Expansion 
Our algorithm requires a 256-bit key, but the signer’s private-
key is only of 224-bits. This calls for a key expansion, which 
randomly selects 4-bytes out of the 28-bytes making up the 
key. These 4-bytes are then appended to get a 32-byte key to be 
used for the subsequent steps.  
 
4.3 Message Padding and Division into Blocks 
The message or data is first null-padded to make it a multiple 
of 512-bits. It is then divided into equal blocks of 512-bits 
each. Only the first 2048 bytes of the message is considered. 
The value of n is set to the number of blocks so obtained, 
where 1≤ n ≤ 32. 
4.4 Final Key Expansion (Rijndael Expansion) 
The expanded secret-key (256-bit) and the constant A (see 
Table I) are passed to the 2nd key expansion routine for a 
further round of expansion, from 256-bits to 512-bits using the 
Rijndael [10] key-expansion algorithm (Algorithm II). The 
key-expansion is achieved by dividing the input into 2 sets of 
128-bits each, and then expanding each set to 256 bits. The 
state array is a set of two 4x4 byte-matrix, and the key is copied 
to it in column-major fashion, and subsequently read out row-
wise as 32-byte blocks. These are then XOR-ed with the 
message-block. The byte-substitution made by the subroutine G 
(from the standard Rijndael subroutine) uses the Rijndael S-
Box to perform the substitution. The value returned by this 
subroutine is XOR-ed with the modified data-block to initialize 
an extended data-block. This is then used as the seed in the 
subsequent iterative rounds, in each step of which, an extended 
data-block is generated on the basis of the previous extended-
block and its corresponding modified-data-block. The final 
512-bit output is generated by alternate concatenations of one 
data-block and one extended-data-block. 
 
Algorithm II. Final Key Expansion (Rijndael Expansion) 
 
Input: The 256-bit expanded-private-key (K) and 512-bit data-block (M) 
Output: Expanded 512-bit private-key 
 
begin 
 declare We[0..1][0..3]; 
S=CopyKeyIntoStateArray(K); 
 W[0..1][0..3]=GetWordsFromStateArray(S); 
 W=XorWithData(W,M); 
 for j=0 to 1 do 
 begin 
  We[j][0]=W[j][0] xor G(W[j][3], j+1); 
  for i=1 to 3 do 
  begin 
   We[j][i]=We[j][i-1] xor W[j][i]; 
  end 
 end 
 return Concatenate(W[0], We[0], W[1], We[1]); 
end 
4.5 Secure Random Key Generation 
The algorithm proceeds in n rounds, where n is the number of 
512-bit blocks in the message. Each round requires a 512-bit 
random-key which is generated using a cryptographically 
secure pseudorandom generator and hence, is sufficiently 
unpredictable. Standard CSPRNG implementations are widely 
available in various programming language libraries. 
4.6 Initial Block Substitution 
In each round, the corresponding message-block is first 
combined with the key using a substitution algorithm 
(Algorithm III). The process consists of 8 rounds with each 
round using a different round-key, generated from the original 
key using a round-key generation algorithm. The round-key for 
a round is generated, using Algorithm IV, by circularly left-
shifting the round-key of the previous round by 1 or 2 bits 
(depending on the particular round), and then XOR-ing it with 
the constant P (see Table I). The rounds in the block-
substitution process implement a Feistel [16] cipher with block-
size of 512-bits. At each step, the data is divided into two 
halves of 256-bits each. The left-half is the same as the right-
half generated after the previous-round. The right-half is 
obtained by XOR-ing the previous left-half and the output of 
the round-cipher algorithm, which takes the previous-right-half 
and the round-key as parameters. The round-cipher algorithm 
(Algorithm V) performs a byte substitution using the Rijndael 
S-Box on the data and XORs it with the round-key to return the 
result. 
4.7 Block Permutation (Shabal Permutation) 
After block substitution, the data undergoes a keyed 
permutation using the Shabal [11] key permutation algorithm, 
and the round-key generated in the previous step. The 
permutation result consists of a pair of blocks of 384 and 512 
bits respectively, which are then concatenated to get a 896-bit 
output. This output is then fed to the CompSub function (see 
Algorithm I), which consists of 2 steps: Block compression 
followed by a second block substitution. 
 
Algorithm III. Initial Block Substitution 
 
Input: 256-bit expanded-key (K), 512-bit message-block (M) 
Output: 512-bit substituted message-block 
begin 
        roundKey=K; 
        data=M; 
        for i=1 to 8 do 
              begin 
              roundKey=GenerateRoundKey(roundKey, i); // Algorithm IV 
              left=data[32..63];    
              temp=left;  
              right=data[0..31];     
              F=RoundCipher(temp, roundKey);  // Algorithm V 
              for j=0 to 31 do 
 right[j]=right[j] xor F[j]; 
              data=Concatenate(left, right); 
        end 
        return data; 
end 
 
4.8 Block Compression 
The permuted output from the Shabal algorithm is then 
compressed using a 7:4 bit compression, proceeding from the 
most significant bit to the least significant in groups of 7 bits 
and replacing each group with a 4-bit nibble using XOR 
operations, as shown in Fig. 1, to get a 512-bit output. 
 
4.9 Second Block Substitution 
The 512-bit output from the block compression phase is fed 
into a substitution phase, which is different from the block 
substitution performed in Algorithm III. Here, each of the 64 
bytes is passed through a 16x16 non-invertible S-Box Z (see 
Table I). The result of the substitution is finally XOR-ed with 
the cumulative cipher-block G in the main nonce generation 
algorithm. 
 
4.10 Digest Generation and Compression 
The result from the Shabal permutation is passed to the digest 
generation function, which is a keyed HMAC using the SHA-
512 algorithm to generate message digests. The resulting 512-
bit digest is further compressed (Algorithm VI) to finally 
generate the 224-bit nonce. The compression process consists 
of 3 steps. Firstly, each successive pair in the digest is XOR-ed 
together, resulting in a 256-bit digest. This is followed by the 
first 4 bytes being XOR-ed with the corresponding last 4 bytes, 
and then discarding the last 4 bytes, leaving a 224-bit digest. 
Finally, this is XOR-ed with the constant Q (see Table I), to 
generate the nonce, which can then be used in the DSA 
signature generation process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm IV. Round Key Generation 
 
Input: Previous-round’s 256-bit key (Key), Round number (r) 
Output: 256-bit round-key for this round 
 
begin 
 if r<3 then K=1 else K=2; 
 for i=0 to 31 do 
  Key[i]=( Key[i] <<< K ) xor P[i]; 
 return Key; 
end 
 
 
Figure 1.  Block Compression. 
 
Algorithm V. Round Cipher 
 
Input: 256-bit data-block (data) and 265-bit round-key (key) 
Output: 256-bit encrypted data-block 
 
begin 
 declare result[32]; 
                  for i=0 to 31 do 
  result[i]=key[i] xor Rijndael_Substitute(data[i]); 
 return result; 
end 
 
Algorithm VI. Digest Compression 
 
Input: 512-bit data (data) 
Output: 224-bit nonce 
 
begin 
 declare result[28], temp[32]; 
                   for i=0 to 31 do 
  temp[i]=data[2*i] xor data[2*i+1]; 
 for i=0 to 3 do 
  temp[i]=temp[i] xor temp[31-i]; 
 for i=0 to 28 do 
  result[i]=temp[i] xor Q[i]; 
 return result; 
end 
 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 Results 
Our proposed algorithm was implemented using Java [20]. The 
constants used in our algorithm are tabulated in Table I [19]. 
The running time of our algorithm is longer than the simple 
pseudorandom nonce generation process recommended in DSS. 
However, our algorithm is more secure, and is still fast, with a 
constant time complexity of O(1) since it is independent of the 
message-length. As per our results, our algorithm exhibits 
strong avalanche effect, as shown in Table II.  The results of 
the both the Chi-Square tests as well as the Monte-Carlo tests, 
suggests strong randomness as tabulated in Table II. 
 
5.2 Analysis 
The nonces generated through our algorithm are secure for use 
in digital signatures due to the following: 
a) The resulting nonces from our algorithm are not 
biased toward the lower range of the DSA domain 
parameter q, due to the lack of any modulo q 
operation, which would otherwise have proved fatal 
[9]. 
b)  Due to the adoption of CSPRNG in generating the 
round-keys, the output is completely unpredictable 
and unique each time a message is signed. The 
inclusion of the message itself in the generation of the 
nonce adds another layer of randomness and, although 
the message is known, the processing it goes through 
inside our algorithm, sufficiently randomize the 
output. This is suggested from our randomness tests. 
c) Since the nonce is generated through our algorithm 
and the user has no influential control over it, the 
subliminal channel in DSA has been closed. Although 
the user can choose the plaintext, the generated nonce 
cannot be predicted and hence, our algorithm is secure 
in this respect as well. 
d) The algorithm uses non-invertible S-Boxes as well as 
standard one-way hash functions, and hence, the 
private-key cannot be recovered from the nonce. 
 
Table I. Constants 
 
Constant Value Used In 
 
A 
 
bb67 ae85 84ca a73b 2574 2d70 78b8 3b89 
25d8 34cc 53da 4798 c720 a648 6e45 a6e2                                              
490b cfd9 5ef1 5dbd a993 0aae 1222 8f87 
cc4c f24d a3a1 ec68 d0cd 33a0 1ad9 a383 
 
 
Algorithm I 
 
P 
 
b9e1 22e6 138c 3ae6 de5e de3b d42d b730  
1b6b f553 af7b 09fd 6ebe f33a 9a9f e577  
 
 
Algorithm IV 
 
Q 
 
2942 6f30 e589 2ab5 7281 6cce fc58  
9935 5f7f 11c3 e24f 3768 a5c7 cb90 
 
 
Algorithm VI 
 
Z 
 
243f 6a88 85a3 08d3 1319 8a2e 0370 7344 
a409 3822 299f 31d0 082e fa98 ec4e 6c89 
4528 21e6 38d0 1377 be54 66cf 34e9 0c6c 
c0ac 29b7 c97c 50dd 3f84 d5b5 b547 0917 
9216 d5d9 8979 fb1b d131 0ba6 98df b5ac 
2ffd 72db d01a dfb7 b8e1 afed 6a26 7e96 
ba7c 9045 f12c 7f99 24a1 9947 b391 6cf7 
0801 f2e2 858e fc16 6369 20d8 7157 4e69 
a458 fea3 f493 3d7e 0d95 748f 728e b658 
718b cd58 8215 4aee 7b54 a41d c25a 59b5 
9c30 d539 2af2 6013 c5d1 b023 2860 85f0 
ca41 7918 b8db 38ef 8e79 dcb0 603a 180e 
6c9e 0e8b b01e 8a3e d715 77c1 bd31 4b27 
78af 2fda 5560 5c60 e655 25f3 aa55 ab94 
5748 9862 63e8 1440 55ca 396a 2aab 10b6 
b4cc 5c34 1141 e8ce a154 86af 7c72 e993 
 
 
(see Section 
4.9) 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Digital Signatures form the basis for message authenticity and 
non-repudiation in modern communication. The entire security 
of the DSA Algorithm lies in keeping the signer’s private-key 
secret. However, the leaking of bits of the random nonce, 
seriously compromises this security by enabling an attacker to 
calculate the private-key from this nonce. Hence, it is 
extremely crucial that this random nonce be generated in a 
more secure way that is sufficiently random, unpredictable, and 
unique for each message. Common pseudorandom sequence 
generators are insufficient for such purposes, as they can be 
predictable. Our algorithm improves upon the existing DSA 
algorithm to enhance its security at the cost of running-time. 
We believe that this enhanced version of DSA can be 
successfully used for entity authentication in electronic 
transactions requiring strict authentication like e-banking [12], 
e-commerce [23], e-learning [21], and e-governance [22]. 
 
Table II. Randomness Analysis 
 
Test Results 
 
Avalanche 
Effect 
 
When 1-bit in the plaintext was randomly changed, the 
following were observed: 
Less than 40% of the bits in the nonce changed = 0.29% of 
the time 
40-50% of the bits in the nonce changed = 65.38% of the 
time 
More than 50% of the bits in the nonce changed = 34.33% of 
the time 
 
Monte-
Carlo PI 
Test 
 
Maximum Deviation from the correct value of PI: 1.26% 
Minimum Deviation from the correct value of PI: 0.04% 
Mean Deviation from the correct value of PI: 0.56% 
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